The most likely outcome of the Nov. 7 election is that in a few years time we’ll look back and wonder what all the excitement was about. If things go as the generals plan, it will still be business as usual for them. They’ll still control the country and enjoy lives of luxury while the people exist in poverty. They’ll still crush any opposition to their rule, and continue to persecute ethnic people.There has been remarkably little detailed discussion on what Burma will look like after the election. Most of the attention has been on the process of the elections—will they be free and fair, who will take part, should there be a boycott?
The focus has been on whether some small political space will be created, which seems increasingly unlikely in view of the Constitution and how Burma's first general election in 20 years is being conducted.
Some speculation centers on the question of whether there will be a generational shift as old generals step down and a new generation takes over. Will the newcomers be more liberal? Again the evidence on the ground suggests this is also very unlikely, as junta leader Snr-Gen Than Shwe lines up hard-liners for key positions.
Some have argued that while on a national level the prospects for improvements are small, in region and state hluttaws, (parliaments) there may be more space to start a process of incremental change. I hope and wish this were true, but I am not optimistic.
Here is why:
For the Karen, one of the largest ethnic nationalities in Burma, most do not live in Karen State, so even if state and regional parliaments did have some power to promote ethnic culture, most Karen would not benefit.
While the constitution technically says every citizen has the right to develop arts, customs and traditions, article 365 of the constitution states that they cannot do so if it is detrimental to national solidarity. As the dictatorship views ethnic diversity as detrimental to national security, in practice there is unlikely to be any real improvement in freedoms.
At the National Convention drafting the Constitution, every single one of the proposals by ethnic representatives that would give more power, autonomy and protection of ethnic cultures was rejected by the regime.
In the region or state hluttaws, it is the national president who decides who the chief minister of the state or region will be. Other ministers are then chosen by the chief minister and the commander in chief of the defence services. Hluttaw representatives do not have the power to reject ministers unless it can be proved that they do not meet basic qualifications, which are so low it is hard to fail. As in national hluttaws, the military also have guaranteed seats reserved for them.
Responsibilities for security and border affairs are reserved for defence services personnel nominated by the commander in chief of the defence services. It is the president, not the chief minister, who appoints approved ministers to their individual posts.
The president only has to coordinate with the chief minister in deciding who gets which post. And to further tighten the president's control over regional hluttaws, the chief minister of a state or region is responsible to the president, not his own hluttaw and its elected representatives.
At the regional and state level the dictatorship’s grip is therefore likely to be as tight as ever.
The central government’s political grip on ethnic areas also remains tight. Aside from the president’s control over regional hluttaws, the commander in chief of the defence services can decide who the national ministers of defence, home affairs and border affairs are, choosing them from serving members of the military. They can also remain as serving members of the military. These three posts are the main key positions that will dominate policy making in ethnic areas.
National legislation overrides local legislation, giving the central government effective veto power over any moves by regional and state hluttaws to increase local control or promote and protect ethnic culture.
The defences services are not answerable to national or state governments in all areas of the armed services. If the commander inchief of the defence services decides there is a state of emergency which could cause disintegration of the union, or even just the broad and undefined “disintegration of national solidarity,” whatever that means, he can take control.
This catch-all phrase of national solidarity could in theory mean that legislation passed by the hluttaw which, in the view of the military, goes too far in promoting ethnic rights and culture is grounds for the military to assume control.
The military will doubtless use this threat as a way of forcing hluttaw representatives not to pass any such legislation.
After the elections, some ethnic political parties with hluttaw representatives will of course use every opportunity they can to improve the lives of their people, but the odds stacked against them are incredibly high.
Maybe they will have some small successes over the course of a few years, but it is a long way from the dramatic and immediate change that our country and our people need.
Equally possible, given the new Constitution, and the dictatorship’s determination to take over or crush armed ethnic groups, is that political and military control over ethnic areas actually increases.
There has been too much focus on the small possible changes after the election, and not enough on how very little will really change, or possibly even get worse.
The imagined changes are equivalent to giving a starving man a single grain of rice. It is not enough. Aung San Suu Kyi has said that we must hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. Sadly, much of the international community seems to be living in a fantasy land when it comes to the election, not just hoping for the best, but trying to convince itself that change may be just round the corner.
We know from experience with this dictatorship, however, that it is the worst which happens to us over and over again.
The election will not bring the change we need. Repression and suffering are getting worse, not better. Those arguing we must “wait and see” are actually saying “sit back and let them die.”
The United Nations and world governments know what will bring that change—tri-partite dialogue. They have said it over and over again for almost 20 years.
But no serious concerted effort has ever been made to secure that dialogue. The last attempt at something close was by UN envoy Razali Ismail almost 10 years ago. Even his efforts largely excluded ethnic representatives, and did not have the full, high level and unified backing of the international community.
How long will it be after the election before the UN and others are forced to admit that no real change has happened and they once again fell for the lies of the dictatorship?
How many people will be killed, raped or die from poverty in that time? The international community doesn’t need to wait. It already knows the election won’t bring change. It already knows what is needed to start a process of real change. It can act today.
Zoya Phan is International Coordinator at Burma Campaign UK. Her autobiography is published as ‘Undaunted’ in the US and as ‘Little Daughter’ in the rest of the world.
http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=19953&page=1
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