Someone Must Always Be in Control

Harn Yawnghwe is the son of Sao Shwe Thaike, who was the last hereditary ruler of the Shan principality of Yawnghwe and the first president of the Republic of the Union of Burma. He was born on April 15, 1948, four months after Burma became an independent nation. After receiving his early education in Burma, he studied in Thailand and then Canada, where he earned a bachelor’s degree and an MBA from McGill University.

Through the years, Harn Yawnghwe has faithfully served Burma’s pro-democracy movement in a variety of capacities. He was editor of Burma Alert, a monthly news digest; advisor to Dr. Sein Win, prime minister of the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma (NCGUB), which claims to be Burma’s government in exile; and managing director of the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), which makes daily news broadcasts to Burma in Burmese and seven ethnic languages.

In February 1997, Harn Yawnghwe became director of the Euro-Burma Office in Brussels, Belgium. This joint project between the European Union and the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation was created to help the Burmese democracy movement prepare for a transition to a democratic government.

The Irrawaddy recently spoke with Harn Yawnghwe in an on-line interview about the current political environment in Burma, the status of reforms, the appropriate response of the international community to changes taking place in the country and ongoing challenges faced by the stakeholders.

Question: There have been reports suggesting that within Burma’s government and military there are reform-minded and hard-line factions who are at loggerheads, what is your assessment of the situation? Do you think that reformists are gaining ground? Or are the two groups just playing a game of good cop/bad cop with the opposition and international community?

Answer: It is not a clear cut case of reformed-minded liberals against hard-liners. The situation may appear that way when analyzed through a theoretical framework. That is why in 2004, Gen Khin Nyunt was seen as a liberal by some analysts. It is also not a case of good cop/bad cop. We should not fool ourselves, the Tatmadaw (Burmese armed forces) does not really care about either the opposition or the international community. Gen Ne Win seized power in 1962 because the Tatmadaw believed that U Nu was losing control. When Ne Win lost control in 1988, the Tatmadaw seized power again.

The key concept is that someone (the Tatmadaw) must always be in control to protect Burma’s independence, sovereignty and national unity. The Seven-step Roadmap was supposed to bring in a strong government with a strong Tatmadaw on standby. To protect himself, Snr-Gen Than Shwe deviated from the script and handed over power to a weak party, a weak president, a weak vice-president, a weak Parliament and a weak Tatmadaw. As a retired senior general, President Thein Sein could not let this situation persist. He had to exert control and he chose to do so through the framework of the 2008 Constitution. The disagreements we are seeing are not ideological. They are personal, because some of the others do not like the idea of U Thein Sein being the supremo. They want to be the supremo themselves.

Having a strong government that can exert control is not a bad thing in itself. All governments, even democratic ones like the US, have to be in control. Otherwise, there would be anarchy. The question is how does one decide who will be in control and how is that control exercised? If it is through the popular will, the rule of law and persuasion, it is perfectly acceptable. But if it is through the force of arms, it is not acceptable. Therefore, while some people may question President U Thein Sein’s legitimacy, the methods he is using are quite acceptable.

The other difference is that unlike Snr-Gen Than Shwe, U Thein Sein seems to be aware that for Burma to survive as a nation in the modern world, urgent reforms are needed. He is not a liberal, but he wants to make sure that his government is in control and able to protect Burma’s interests (against other nations and big business).

Will his reforms succeed? That is still an open question.
If his rivals can unseat him, if he is unable to convince the population that his reforms will alleviate their suffering, if he is unable to build peace with the ethnic nationalities, if his government does not have the capacity to deliver on his promises, if the international community rejects his efforts and continues to exert more pressure, etc., he will fail.

The question we need to ask ourselves is this: What is the alternative? Will democracy be better served if he fails? Who or what will replace him? It will definitely not be a more liberal democratic civilian government. The most likely scenario is that the Tatmadaw will seize power. Given the failure of U Thein Sein’s experiment, the next regime is likely to be more conservative and repressive, not more liberal.

Q: What reforms would you like to see? What specific actions should Burma’s government take now?

A: A lot of reforms have already been promised. The ones related to the economy are very complicated and extremely hard to implement because they are interconnected. We also have problems that have been ignored and have festered for more than five decades. I think it is now more important for the government to implement promised reforms than to embark on new ones. The difficulty in implementing any reform is that the government may not have the capacity to deliver. If expectations exceed the government’s capacity to deliver, more reforms could be counter-productive. Repealing some security laws, declaring an amnesty, releasing political prisoners, putting in place procedures to allow exiles to return, lifting censorship laws, allowing journalists more freedom and allowing foreign journalists to visit are some of the easier reforms that will not overtax the already overloaded bureaucracy.

Q: President Thein Sein’s decision to suspend the China-backed Myitsone Dam project is partly viewed as a strategic move to foster better relations with Western powers, including the US, and thereby to balance Burma’s international relationships. Do you agree with that assessment? Was this really an effort by Burma to counter Chinese influence? Some critics say that by playing the China card, Burma can evade real political reform and still make friends with the West, do you agree?

A: I do not believe it is related to a grand international strategy. It is wishful thinking on the part of some people in the West. The suspension has to do with sending a domestic message that the president is the one in charge, that there is now a new strong man in place. The controversial dam had been negotiated in secret between a Chinese company and some past and present members of the government. U Thein Sein was apparently unaware of some aspects of the deals. The fact that it became a national cause célèbre gave U Thein Sein the ammunition that he was looking for. The issue of the Myitsone Dam was of concern not only to the Kachin people but all the people of Burma. Issues like that can really be used to build national unity. I welcome the president’s decision. I do not think China will intervene. It is not happy that one of its private companies is losing money, but it has too much to lose to use strong arm tactics with Burma.

As for reforms, the facts are that if the President wants to survive and protect Burma’s sovereignty, he cannot avoid reforms. There is no other way forward. Most people are still skeptical about the reforms but U Thein Sein is taking a lot of risks and going far beyond what anyone had expected. The danger now is of a backlash from those—inside and outside the country—who prefer the status quo and who do not want change.

Q: Some activists and dissidents believe the EU’s Burma policy has been soft, non-comprehensive and one-sided—almost an appeasement of the regime and its apologists. What kind of policy changes are you expecting in the EU bloc towards Burma? Meanwhile, the US is reportedly considering relaxing restrictions on financial assistance to Burma. If many political prisoners are released, as is widely anticipated, is it time for the West to lift their economic sanctions against Burma? Also, without lifting sanctions, what actions can the EU and the US take to show Napyidaw that they are positively responding to Burma's reform initiatives? Do you expect the IMF and World Bank to provide greater technical and financial assistance to Burma in the near future?

A: If someone is weak, he may try to appease a bully in the hope that the bully will leave him alone. This hardly applies to the case of the EU and Burma. The EU does not need Burma to survive. It is also much stronger than Burma in very many ways.
Why would the EU need to appease Burma? Like most Western governments, the EU in the early 1990s and 2000s was very open to policy advice from the opposition. But after 15 years (which is three or four life times for most elected governments), the EU started to question the soundness of the opposition’s strategy, which was based mainly on confronting and isolating the Burmese regime.

We have to remember that during the period that Burma has been in conflict with itself, Europe was rediscovering itself by reconciling differences, opening borders and trying to resolve most conflicts through negotiations. The EU began to develop its own Burma policy based on democratic principles, but also exploring ways to help resolve the problems so that democracy can prosper in Burma.

No one can accuse the EU of not being comprehensive. It takes years to develop a policy and it requires the elected governments of twenty-seven nations to unanimously agree. But since the EU was no longer 100 percent in agreement with the Burmese opposition, especially those in exile, some people started claiming that the EU is soft on democracy and human rights and that it is lop-sided in its approach to the regime. The EU could never abandon democratic principles even if all the 27 governments agreed, because the people of Europe would never accept it. Therefore, we can rest assured on that point. We need to instead examine ourselves first to see if we are being democratic before blaming others.

I believe the EU will continue to engage the government of Myanmar [Burma]. It will help build up the capacity of both civil society and the civil service (health, education, livelihood, poverty eradication, economy, environment, etc.). The concept is that without an empowered civil society, people’s rights will not be fully protected. Similarly, without a functioning non-corrupt professional civil service, no government can deliver essential services to the people.

The EU may lift sanctions if they are satisfied that the reforms are genuine. Releasing political prisoners would be one of the factors it would consider. But sanctions are not the cornerstone in EU policy. The key is genuine policy dialogue and cooperation to bring about a democratic, just and open society. The IMF and the World Bank may want to provide greater technical and financial assistance. But given that US presidential elections are next year, I very much doubt much can be expected from the US until that is over. Burma is just not a priority.

Q: You once backed the sanctions policy on Burma and now you are seen as a proponent of engagement. What made you change your mind?

A: People get emotional when sanctions are discussed. It becomes a debate about whether wrong-doers should be allowed to prosper or be punished. While sanctions may have that moral aspect to them, sanctions were seen mainly as a political tool when we (the NCGUB, National Council for the Union of Burma, National League for Democracy-Liberated Areas, etc.) first discussed them in the early 1990s. The various governments also enacted sanctions to achieve political goals. The question is, were the goals achieved? If not, we should discontinue them. We had proposed sanctions because we wanted the regime to talk to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. We had hoped that a compromise could be reached, and that democracy and human rights would be restored. The facts are that short of a military intervention (which will not happen), there will never be enough pressure on the military to make them compromise. Applying more sanctions is like trying to fill a leaky balloon with air. It will never get filled. It is not a question of rewarding the generals by lifting sanctions.

Sanctions also paralyzed the international community. Nobody wanted to take the initiative for fear of being labeled as undemocratic and supporting the regime. We needed the international community to be more active in other ways to help bring about change. The paralysis was not useful to us or helpful to the people of Burma. That was why I no longer supported sanctions. When we cannot get what we want in exactly the way that we want it, we need to find a way to get what we want given the circumstances. For example, U Thein Sein is talking with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. They seem to have reached some kind of understanding. They seem prepared to compromise. Is that not what we initially wanted? Yet some of us are still asking for more sanctions. What do we want? We have become so reactive and negative that we counter everything without evaluating whether or not it has any merit. I once said in 2005, that if we want real change in Burma, the Tatmadaw will have to spearhead it because it holds the power. The government of U Thein Sein is now spearheading reforms.
It is possible that real change will come and eventually, democracy in Burma.

Q: Recent decisions by the Burmese government clearly suggest that it has made a break with the past military rule. But why haven't we seen much of an improvement in its handling of ethnic minorities, with continued armed clashes in northeastern Burma with these groups? Would it be proper for the West to proactively respond to Naypyidaw's initiatives until this issue is properly resolved? What is your reaction to ongoing human rights violations in ethnic regions as well as the calls for a Commission of Inquiry?

A: The fact that there has not been much improvement shows that the problems are deep-seated and will require much more effort and time than people expect. Trust and confidence have to be built up to overcome the decades of ill treatment and suffering. The government will need to show its good faith by acknowledging that its soldiers do act with impunity when dealing with the ethnic nationalities. Releasing ethnic leaders from prison so that they can help in the healing process will also go a long way in resolving the problems. Naypyidaw can do a lot and it will be much more effective if they do it on their own like U Thein Sein did with the Myitsone Dam, than to have the West or other foreign governments getting involved. But the international community can help by encouraging both sides to negotiate and providing technical assistance and support in the whole de-militarization process. The Commission of Inquiry is a non-starter and at this point, I think we should concentrate on practical steps, not on theoretical possibilities.

Q: If Burma is opened up one day, what role would you and your organization like to play in the country?

A: The Euro-Burma Office is engaged in building the capacity of the younger generation and civil society organizations in Burma. We have also been engaged in building understanding between various ethnic groups and encouraging people to work together to resolve problems through dialogue and negotiations instead of the force of arms. In general, we have also been able to bridge the gap between the people of Burma and the international community. If Burma opened up, we could do our job more effectively.

http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=22237&page=4